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MORE MONEY, MORE PROBLEMS: NCAA MODERNIZATION AND 






In 2019, California passed a law that would allow collegiate 
athletes in California to receive compensation for their name, image, 
and likeness. Currently, the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
distinguishes between amateur and professional athletes and does not 
allow student athletes to receive compensation beyond scholarships. 
This Comment analyzes noteworthy case law and summarizes the 
arguments of current and former student athletes over the years. The 
new California legislation opened the door for substantial change and 
challenged the NCAA to finally modernize their bylaws and 
regulations. Furthermore, this Comment recommends that the NCAA 
adapt the definitions contained in their bylaws to create consistency 
and implement a new compensation model that allows student athletes 
to financially benefit from their name, image, and likeness while 
maintaining their amateur status.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For years, collegiate athletes, postsecondary educational 
institutions, and athletic organizations and associations have 
addressed the controversial topic of collegiate athlete compensation. 
However, in September 2019, California took the first step in creating 
substantial change for student athletes. The California law challenges 
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA” or the 
“Association”) and its current rules regarding amateurism and 
compensation. Beginning in January 2023, individuals in California 
who compete in intercollegiate athletics will have the right to receive 
compensation for their name, image, and likeness (“NIL”) and obtain 
professional representation. In response to this legislation, the NCAA 
announced that each division will evaluate their current rules and 
propose modifications that accommodate student athlete 
compensation, while maintaining NCAA amateurism standards. In 
addition to drafting new regulations, the NCAA needs to redefine its 
terms to allow amateurs to benefit from their skills without direct 
compensation for their participation.  
The goal of this Comment is to analyze the ongoing issue of 
student athlete compensation, evaluate the validity of current 
legislation, and ultimately suggest a uniform model for the NCAA and 
its member schools to implement. Section II will give a background of 
student athlete compensation and some of the factors that continue to 
play a role in the controversy. This section will discuss the history of 
the NCAA, its rules, and how it currently regulates intercollegiate 
athletics. It will also address noteworthy court cases, demonstrating 
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how current and former athletes have challenged the validity of the 
NCAA rules. A brief discussion of the Sherman Antitrust Act is also 
necessary to understand the claims athletes bring against the NCAA. 
Section III will outline the new California legislation and explain its 
provisions. Then, Section IV will outline recommendations provided 
by the NCAA Board of Governors Federal and State Legislation 
Working Group Report, consider how the recommendations should be 
implemented, and analyze the impact of new regulations on college 
athletics as a whole. Lastly, Section V will provide detailed 
suggestions for the NCAA as it begins the modernization process, 
such as amending their bylaws and implementing a new compensation 
model. This Comment proposes a distributed trust fund compensation 
model with three essential components: student athletes’ right to 
receive payments, scheduled distribution, and regulation and 
oversight. The proposed model allows student athletes to receive 
compensation from endorsement deals and considers issues that 
previous models have not addressed.1   
II. BACKGROUND 
A. National Collegiate Athletic Association 
Regulation of intercollegiate football has been a priority in the 
United States for over a century, beginning with the need to monitor 
the safety of college athletes.2 The issue became a national concern in 
 
 1. Student athlete compensation has been a controversial and highly analyzed 
topic with many articles published relating to antitrust laws, NCAA amateurism and 
eligibility rules, paying student athletes, student athletes’ right to publicity, etc. See 
generally Stanton Wheeler, Rethinking Amateurism and the NCAA, 15 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 213 (2004); Thomas Bright, NCAA Institutes Multi-Year Scholarships, 
8 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179 (2012); Audrey C. Sheetz, Student 
Athletes vs. NCAA: Preserving Amateurism in College Sports Amidst the Fight for 
Player Compensation, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 865 (2016); William D. Holthaus, Jr., Ed 
O’Bannon v. NCAA: Do Former NCAA Athletes Have a Case Against the NCAA for 
its Use of Their Likeness?, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 369 (2010); Victoria Roessler, 
College Athletes Rights After O’Bannon: Where do College Athlete Intellectual 
Property Rights Go From Here?, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 935 (2016); 
Stephanie M. Greene, Regulating the NCAA: Making the Calls Under the Sherman 
Antitrust Act and Title IX, 52 ME. L. REV. 81 (2000); Michael S. McLeran, Playing 
for Peanuts: Determining Fair Compensation for NCAA Student-Athletes, 65 
DRAKE L. REV. 255 (2017). 
 2. Rodney Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association’s Role in Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. 
REV. 9, 10 (2000).   
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1905 when President Roosevelt invited officials from major football 
programs to participate in a White House conference to evaluate 
football rules.3 After injuries continued to occur, representatives from 
the nation’s major college football programs gathered to evaluate the 
possibility of developing valid and effective safety regulations or 
consider whether college football should be eliminated altogether.4 
These representatives formed the Rules Committee.5 The new Rules 
Committee met with participants in the White House conference in an 
effort to reform college football rules.6 The combined sixty-two 
members ultimately formed the Intercollegiate Athletic Association, 
later renamed the NCAA in 1910.7 Originally, the NCAA formulated 
safety rules for various collegiate sports.8 
In the following years, public interest in college athletics 
increased, causing a similar increase in commercialization.9 A rise in 
access to higher education along with growing popularity of 
television, radio, and broadcasting attracted further attention to 
collegiate sports.10 This created an incentive for more universities and 
colleges to create athletic programs or expand their existing 
programs.11 These factors resulted in an increase in NCAA authority, 
allowing the Association to create additional rules, specifically the 
“Sanity Code.”12 The NCAA established the Sanity Code to “alleviate 
the proliferation of exploitive practices in the recruitment of student 
athletes.”13 However, after discovering that the rules were ineffective, 
the NCAA repealed the Sanity Code in 1951, replacing it with the 
Committee on Infractions.14 
Since its formation, the NCAA gained more and more 
authority, drifting further from its initial purpose.15 Now, the NCAA 
 
 3. Id. at 12.   
 4. Id.  
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 14.  
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 15.  
 15. Roessler, supra note 1, at 940.   
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develops and enforces rules that promote fairness and a level playing 
field.16   
1. Structure & Governance 
The NCAA is an unincorporated, non-profit organization, 
consisting of “1,117 colleges and universities, 100 athletic 
conferences, and 40 sports organizations.”17 The members represent 
19,750 teams and over half a million college athletes competing in 
twenty-four sports across three divisions.18 The NCAA’s purpose is 
“prioritizing academics well-being and fairness so college athletes can 
succeed on the field, in the class, and for life.”19 The Association’s 
ranks include “college presidents, athletic directors, faculty athletics 
representatives, compliance officers, and conference staff.”20 Other 
ranks include “academic support staff, coaches, sports information 
directors, and health and safety personnel.”21 Athletic directors are 
responsible for overseeing their university’s athletic staff and guiding 
policy decisions, while compliance officers ensure athletes and staff 
follow the NCAA-mandated rules.22  
The NCAA divides member schools into three divisions based 
on factors such as university size, athletic program funding, and public 
appeal.23 Each division maintains certain rules and regulations that 
member schools must comply with.24 Division I consists of 350 
colleges and universities, most of which have large student bodies, 
manage substantial athletics budgets, and offer numerous scholarship 
opportunities to their students.25 Within Division I, member schools 
 
 16. Questions and Answers on Name, Image, and Likeness, NCAA (Oct. 29, 
2019), http://www.ncaa.org/questions-and-answers-name-image-and-likeness 
[https://perma.cc/5RVH-XNFZ]. 
 17. What is the NCAA?, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-
center/ncaa-101/what-ncaa [https://perma.cc/48A2-ZWPH]. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. About NCAA Division II, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about?division=d2 
[https://perma.cc/G4PZ-463G]. 




 25. NCAA Division I, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about?division=d1 
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are further divided based on college football sponsorship.26 The 
Football Bowl Subdivision (“FBS”) represents schools that compete 
in top tier bowl games, making it arguably the most competitive 
subdivision in Division I.27 The FBS contains well-known 
conferences, such as the Big Ten, Pac-12, the Southeastern 
Conference (SEC), the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), and the Big 
12.28 These five conferences are made up of sixty-five programs and 
are referred to collectively as the “Power Five.”29 No other sport in 
this division is further subdivided in this way.30 Division II includes 
310 member schools and provides scholarships or athletic aid to 60% 
of student athletes in the division.31 Finally, Division III is the largest 
division in the NCAA with over 400 member schools.32 In this 
division, one out of six students are student athletes; however, 
Division III member schools do not award athletic scholarships.33 
The NCAA governance structure consists of committees 
through which member representatives propose rules for college 
sports regarding compliance, recruiting, academics, and 
championships.34 Member schools ultimately have the power to adopt 
proposed rules and implement them on their campuses.35 This 
structure also allows volunteers from member schools to serve in the 
legislative groups that govern each division.36 The Board of Governors 
is the highest governing authority in the NCAA, comprised of 
presidents and chancellors from each division.37 The Association 
publishes the Board of Governors Report about four or five times each 
 
[https://perma.cc/6CCV-EN9X]. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Chris Murphy, Madness, Inc.: How Everyone is Getting Rich Off College 
Sports, Except the Players 4–5 (Mar. 2019), https://www.murphy.senate.gov/downl 
oad/madness-inc [https://perma.cc/B7Y3-K9BH]. 
 28. College Football Conferences, ESPN, http://www.espn.com/college-
football/conferences [https://perma.cc/ZTW4-JBHB]. 
 29. Murphy, supra note 27, at 5. 
 30. NCAA Division I, supra note 25. 
 31. Our Three Divisions, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-
center/ncaa-101/our-three-divisions [https://perma.cc/9UNZ-WFQP]. 
 32. About Division III, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about?division=d3 
[https://perma.cc/4TRH-MSC9]. 
 33. Our Three Divisions, supra note 31. 
 34. What is the NCAA?, supra note 17. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Governance, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/governance 
[https://perma.cc/RT78-TRR7]. 
 37. Id. 
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year, outlining the agenda for the meeting, issues discussed, and any 
decisions made during the meeting.38 
The NCAA emphasizes amateurism as a major pillar of 
collegiate athletics, ensuring all college athletes compete on a level 
playing field.39 The underlining idea of this principle is that student 
athletes and their participation in collegiate athletics should be 
motivated first and foremost by education.40 Therefore, the 
Association emphasizes the importance of “maintaining a clear line of 
demarcation between college athletics and professional sports.”41 The 
NCAA does not define amateur or amateurism in their bylaws or 
manuals, instead it defines what an amateur athlete is by describing 
what it is not.42 However, the NCAA Division I Manual (the 
“Manual”) does define student athlete.43 The Manual states that a 
student athlete is a student who enrolled in a university in response to 
solicitation from a member of the university’s athletics staff to 
ultimately compete in a collegiate athletics program.44 The Manual 
defines professional athlete as an individual “who receives any kind 
of payment, directly or indirectly, for athletics participation except as 
permitted by the governing legislation of the Association.”45 The 
Manual goes on to define pay as “the receipt of funds, awards, or 
benefits not permitted by the governing legislation of the Association 
for participation in athletics.”46 The rules outline the Amateurism 
Certification Process that student athletes and institutions must 
complete for athletes to secure eligibility for practice or competition.47 
The Manual also lists the various ways in which an individual can lose 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Stacey Osburn, Board of Governors starts process to enhance name, image, 




 40. NCAA, 2019-20 NCAA Division I Manual, 3 (Aug. 2019), 
https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/reports/getReport/90008 [https://perma.cc/UUX9-
9V73]. 
 41. Sheetz, supra note 1, at 871 (quoting 2013-14 NCAA Division I Manual 1, 1 
(2013) http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D114.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N5XP-A6AY]). 
 42. NCAA, 2019-20 NCAA Division I Manual, supra note 40. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 62.  
 47. Id. at 63.  
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his or her amateur status, including “using his or her athletic skill for 
pay; entering into an agreement with an agent; or accepting a promise 
of pay.”48  
2. Association & Member Schools’ Profitability 
The commercialization of college sports provides the NCAA 
and its member schools with large profits primarily generated from 
ticket sales, merchandise, television contracts, and other various 
revenue streams.49 In 2018, the NCAA reported over $1 billion in total 
revenue.50 Proceeds from television and marketing rights alone 
account for over $800 million of the total reported revenue.51 
Similarly, the Association reported about $57 million in revenue from 
sales, services, and other similar activities.52 The NCAA suggests that 
it provides over $10 million in scholarships to students and member 
schools annually.53 However, the NCAA only awards these 
scholarships to student athletes to pursue a graduate degree or to 
“complete their undergraduate degree after they have exhausted their 
eligibility for other athletics-related financial aid.”54  
According to the Department of Education, college athletics 
programs generated $14 billion in total revenue in 2018.55 Division I 
and Division II member schools award over $2.9 billion in athletics 
scholarships annually to about 150,000 student athletes.56 In 2011, the 
NCAA enacted legislation allowing member schools to award multi-
year scholarships.57 While this was a step in the right direction to 
 
 48. Id.   
 49. Murphy, supra note 27, at 2–3.  
 50. DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP, NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION 
AND SUBSIDIARIES: CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF AND FOR THE 
YEARS ENDED AUGUST 31, 2018 AND 2017, SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION FOR 
THE YEAR ENDED AUGUST 31, 2018, AND INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’ REPORT 4 
(2018). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. NCAA Scholarships & Grants, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources 
/ncaa-scholarships-and-grants [https://perma.cc/7DKJ-BK98]. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Equity in Athletics Data Analysis, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, 
https://ope.ed.gov/athletics/Trend/public/#/subjects [https://perma.cc/WMU6-
SLPM]. 
 56. Scholarships, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/student-
athletes/future/scholarships [https://perma.cc/JJY6-RACV]. 
 57. Bright, supra note 1, at 179.   
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protect student athletes, the legislation received backlash from athletic 
directors and universities who argued that the legislation would hinder 
the process of recruiting new players.58 Although the legislation 
ultimately created stability for student athletes, the opposition shown 
by member schools indicates their desire to control the financial power 
over their student athletes.59  
NCAA member schools, specifically Division I schools, 
generate a substantial amount of money from endorsement deals.60 In 
2018, college programs executed the largest endorsement deals with 
Nike, Adidas, and Under Armour.61 The University of California, Los 
Angeles conducted an endorsement deal with Under Armour valued 
at an annual average of $12.76 million, making it the most valuable 
deal that year.62 Other top programs such as the University of 
Louisville and the University of Washington executed deals with 
Adidas for an average annual value of $10.96 million and $7.89 
million respectively.63 Nike continued to dominate college athletics 
branding by establishing a deal with the University of Texas valued at 
an annual average of $9.76 million.64 These examples highlight the 
market demand for collegiate endorsements that may be available to 
high performing student athletes during their collegiate career.65 
B. Sherman Antitrust Act 
It is important to understand how the Sherman Antitrust Act 
(“Sherman Act”) relates to the NCAA, specifically how courts have 
 
 58. See id. at 180. 
 59. Id. at 181.  
 60. See Daniel Kleiman, The Most Valuable College Endorsement Deals 2018, 
FORBES (Sept. 11, 2018, 9:54 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielkleinman/2018/09/11/the-most-valuable-
college-apparel-deals-2018/#6c32f1df4be9 [https://perma.cc/D8WX-U2C6]. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Daniel Kleiman, The Most Valuable College Apparel Deals: UCLA Leads 
As Gear Companies’ New Mindset Thwarts Rivals, FORBES (Sept. 13, 2019, 8:00 
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielkleinman/2019/09/13/ucla-most-
valuable-college-apparel-deals/#2645d8146762 [https://perma.cc/ND3X-GSBL]. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Daniel Kleiman, The Most Valuable College Endorsement Deals 2018, 
FORBES (Sept. 11, 2018, 9:54 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielkleinman/2018/09/11/the-most-valuable-
college-apparel-deals-2018/#6c32f1df4be9 [https://perma.cc/D8WX-U2C6]; 
Kleiman, supra note 62. 
 65. Id. 
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interpreted whether the Association’s regulations are subject to the 
Sherman Act’s protection. The Sherman Act prohibits the restraint of 
any trade or commerce that has a commercial or business objective.66   
When bringing a claim under the Sherman Act, “plaintiffs 
must show (1) that there was a contract, combination, or conspiracy; 
(2) the agreement unreasonably restrained trade under either per se 
rule of illegality or rule of reason analysis; and (3) that the restraint 
affected interstate commerce.”67 The conduct at issue must have 
restrained trade, commerce, or commercial competition.68 When 
analyzing a Sherman Act claim, courts established the rule of reason 
analysis and evaluated reasonableness by weighing the 
anticompetitive effect against the procompetitive justifications.69 To 
apply the rule of reason test, the plaintiff must show that a cognizable 
market exists.70 The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the 
challenged conduct has a significant adverse impact on competition as 
a whole.71 If the plaintiff meets their initial burden, the burden then 
shifts to the defendant who must provide evidence that the conduct has 
sufficient procompetitive “redeeming virtues.”72 Then, if the 
defendant provides sufficient procompetitive effects, the plaintiff must 
show that any procompetitive effects argued by the defendant could 
be achieved with less restrictive means.73  
It is also important to evaluate how the Sherman Act interacts 
with the NCAA and the Association’s amateurism rules. Courts 
typically grant the sports industry vast deference when deciding cases 
involving antitrust claims.74 Some critics refer to this as special 
treatment.75 The NCAA amateurism defense originated in the 
Supreme Court case NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of 
Oklahoma.76 In this case, members of the NCAA argued that the 
 
 66. Greene, supra note 1, at 83.   
 67. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust 
Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1091 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
 68. Holthaus, supra note 1, at 377.   
 69. Id. at 378.  
 70. Id. at 377–78. 
 71. Id. at 378. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Gabe Feldman, A Modest Proposal for Taming the Antitrust Beast, 41 PEPP. 
L. REV. 249, 249 (2014). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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Association’s plan to televise college football games violated antitrust 
laws.77 The plan limited “the total amount of televised intercollegiate 
football” games and “the number of games that any one team may 
televise.”78 It also prohibited any member of the NCAA from selling 
television rights except as permitted by the plan.79 In determining the 
reasonableness of the restraint, the Court decided that the promotion 
of amateurism and academic ideals are sufficient procompetitive 
virtues under the rule of reason analysis and are consistent with the 
goals of the Sherman Act.80 The Court also described amateurism as 
an economic justification, arguing that amateurism rules are essential 
to the unique product of college football.81 This analysis asks courts 
to balance the “anticompetitive economic effects of restrictions on 
student athletes with the social benefits of amateurism to college 
sports.”82 Critics argue that the promotion of amateurism is a social 
goal and therefore should have no impact on the legal analysis of the 
restraint.83 Although Board of Regents did not involve the regulation 
of student athlete compensation, Justice Stevens emphasized 
compensation caps to explain why competing institutions must 
cooperate to continue marketing NCAA sports products.84 Justice 
Stevens agreed with the NCAA’s argument that the amateurism rules 
protect collegiate sports from becoming minor league or professional 
athletics.85 
Board of Regents was not the first antitrust claim against the 
NCAA and will not be the last. The overall basis for bringing an 
antitrust claim against the Association is that the member schools 
under the NCAA conspire to keep student athletes’ compensation 
fixed at tuition and educational fees, essentially forming a covenant 
not to compete.86 However, courts in the most notable antitrust cases 
 
 77. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 78. Id. at 94.  
 79. Id. 
 80. Feldman, supra note 74, at 252. 
 81. Id. at 252–53.  
 82. Id. at 257.  
 83. Id. 
 84. Thomas Baker, Why the Latest NCAA Lawsuit is Unlikely to Change its 




 85. Id. 
 86. Kenneth L. Shropshire, The Erosion of the NCAA Amateurism Model, 14 
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have continually agreed that “the rules governing intercollegiate 
athletics are not always subject to strict antitrust analysis.”87 
C. Case Law 
The NCAA is no stranger to court battles regarding the validity 
and enforceability of its amateurism rules and overall conduct.88 
Historically, the majority of litigation focused on allegations that the 
NCAA rules violate antitrust laws.89 Over time, current and former 
student athletes fought for their right to compensation, making 
progress through the following noteworthy cases.90  
1. Gaines v. NCAA 
To establish a Section 2 violation of the Sherman Act, the court 
must determine that there was an unlawful exercise of monopoly 
power by an organization. Under Section 2, an unlawful monopoly 
consists of “(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant 
market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as 
distinguished from the growth or development as a consequence of a 
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”91 The federal 
antitrust laws are in place to prevent restraints on “free competition in 
business and commercial transactions.”92 In Gaines v. NCAA, the 
ultimate question was whether the NCAA amateurism and eligibility 
rules were “unreasonably exclusive” or “anticompetitive.”93 Gaines 
argued that the NCAA rules were exclusive because they discouraged 
talented college football players from pursuing a career in the NFL 
and created a system of maintaining control over the sport’s top 
athletes.94 The court determined that the NCAA eligibility rules were 
not in place to provide the Association with a commercial advantage, 
rather they were meant to protect the unique product of college 
football from commercial influences.95 Therefore, the court held that 
 
SPG ANTITRUST 46, 49 (2000).  
 87. Greene, supra note 1, at 83.   
 88. Baker, supra note 84. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 742 (M.D. Tenn. 1990). 
 92. Id. at 743.  
 93. Id. at 745.  
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 744.  
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the NCAA amateurism and eligibility rules were not subject to 
scrutiny under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.96  
2. Banks v. NCAA 
In 1992, the NCAA faced another challenge to its rules under 
a slightly different theory.97 Braxton Banks, a college football player, 
filed suit against the NCAA alleging that the Association’s “no-draft” 
and “no-agent” rules violated antitrust laws under the Sherman Act.98 
Banks argued that the NCAA rules restricted trade in two specific 
ways.99 First, he argued the NCAA restrains trade by prohibiting 
member universities from allowing athletes to rejoin college athletics 
once that athlete has elected to be considered in the draft or hired an 
agent to pursue professional sports.100 Second, Banks broadly argued 
that the NCAA placed a restraint on trade by requiring member 
institutions to follow the Association’s strict rules and declining to 
grant waivers of those rules.101 Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit noted 
the previously held requirement that in order to make a claim for a 
violation of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff must allege anticompetitive 
effects on a market.102 Because Banks did not allege that the NCAA 
rules had an anticompetitive impact on an identifiable market, the 
court affirmed the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a 
claim.103   
3. O’Bannon v. NCAA 
The NCAA rules serve a procompetitive purpose by promoting 
an understanding of amateurism, thereby preserving consumer 
demand for college sports.104 In O’Bannon v. National Collegiate 
Athletic Association, a group of current and former college football 
and men’s basketball players alleged that the NCAA compensation 
rules violated the Sherman Act by restricting trade relating to the 
 
 96. Id. at 745.  
 97. Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1083–84 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 98. Id. at 1088.  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 1087.  
 104. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1059 (9th Cir. 
2015). 
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athletes’ NIL.105 After an appeal from the district court ruling in favor 
of the plaintiffs, the Ninth Circuit contemplated whether the NCAA 
rules were subject to antitrust laws and if so, whether they were an 
unlawful restraint on trade.106 The Ninth Circuit held that although the 
NCAA rules were likely procompetitive, they were still subject to 
antitrust laws and should be analyzed under the rule of reason.107 
Under the rule of reason, the court identified two relevant markets 
affected by the NCAA rules: the college education market and the 
group licensing market.108 The court concluded that the NCAA rules 
had an anticompetitive effect on the college education market, 
reasoning that without the rules, colleges would compete with each 
other by offering compensation beyond the institution’s cost of 
attendance.109 Although the Ninth Circuit agreed that banning 
compensation for NIL violated antitrust laws, the court struck down 
Judge Wilken’s suggestion at the district level that student athletes 
benefit from this use of their NIL in the form of  $5,000 annually.110 
The court reasoned that the NCAA had the power to control payments 
that are non-educational or that are not “tethered to education.”111 
Ultimately, the court rejected the district court’s decision and allowed 
the NCAA to maintain their amateurism rules, finding that the rules 
were likely procompetitive.112  
In these cases, the courts established that the Association’s 
rules protected the unique nature of college sports and were not 
“unreasonably exclusive” or “anticompetitive.”113 Similarly, plaintiffs 
must allege anticompetitive effects on an identifiable market in order 
to bring a valid claim against the NCAA.114 Although the 
Association’s rules are subject to antitrust laws, courts have also found 
that the Association’s rules are likely procompetitive and that the 
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NCAA has the power to control payments that are not related to 
education.115 Based on this analysis, courts have historically provided 
the NCAA with favorable treatment regarding challenges to its 
amateurism and eligibility rules.116 
III. FAIR PAY TO PLAY ACT 
In September 2019, Governor Gavin Newsom signed Senate 
Bill No. 206, which will allow California students competing in 
collegiate athletics to obtain compensation and representation.117 The 
Bill, originally proposed by Senator Nancy Skinner, will take effect in 
January 2023 and will be added to the California Education Code.118 
The provisions in this legislation, called the Fair Pay to Play Act (“the 
Act”), challenge historic rules prohibiting student athletes from 
receiving compensation for their NIL.119  
First, the Act directly discusses the issue of compensation, 
addressing the rights of student athletes, athletic organizations and 
associations, and postsecondary educational institutions.120 The first 
provision expressly prohibits any postsecondary education institution 
from enforcing a rule that prevents a student competing in 
intercollegiate athletics from receiving compensation for their NIL.121 
Within the first provision, the Act states that a student athlete’s receipt 
of compensation shall not affect their scholarship eligibility.122 The 
Act goes on to state that any group or organization with authority over 
intercollegiate athletics, including the NCAA, “shall not prevent a 
student participating in intercollegiate athletics from receiving 
compensation for their NIL.”123 The provision also addresses 
postsecondary educational institutions, stating that any group or 
organization with authority over intercollegiate athletics shall not 
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prevent a postsecondary educational institution from competing in 
intercollegiate athletics due to the compensation of one of its student 
athletes.124 The Act defines postsecondary educational institution as 
“any campus of the University of California or the California State 
University, an independent institution of higher education, or a private 
postsecondary educational institution.”125 The Act applies to 
individuals competing in intercollegiate athletics, but it maintains the 
current rule prohibiting prospective student athletes from receiving 
compensation.126  
The next group of provisions addresses a student athlete’s 
ability to obtain professional representation while competing in 
intercollegiate athletics.127 The Act permits student athletes to obtain 
professional representation regarding legal matters and contracts, 
representation by agents, and legal representation by an attorney.128 
Professional representation must be licensed in California and comply 
with relevant sections of the Business and Professional Code 
regarding agent and legal representation.129  
The Act specifies how potential student athlete contracts 
should cooperate with their respective team contract.130 The student 
athlete’s contract to receive compensation for their NIL should not 
conflict with the athlete’s team contract, and the student athlete must 
disclose the nature of the contract with an official at the athlete’s 
education institution.131 Team contracts that are modified, renewed, or 
entered into after the enactment of the legislation must not prevent a 
student athlete from using their NIL for a commercial purpose while 
the student athlete is not engaged in official team events.132  
One provision specifically addresses the receipt of 
compensation in relation to a student athlete’s scholarship.133 The 
provision states that a student athlete’s scholarship is not considered 
compensation for the purposes of the Act, and a scholarship must not 
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be revoked due to a student athlete’s receipt of compensation or use of 
professional representation.134  
IV. NCAA MODERNIZATION 
After California passed the new legislation, the NCAA faced 
pressure to announce its position.135 The NCAA agreed that changes 
need to be made but that changes should occur on a national level 
through the Association’s governance structure.136 California is not 
alone in this movement.137 According to the NCAA Division I Update 
on the NIL topic, “thirty-one additional states have introduced or are 
expected to introduce [NIL] related legislation.”138 Florida announced 
its support for the legislation, and New York revealed a similar, yet 
more progressive, bill called the New York Collegiate Athletic 
Participation Compensation Act.139 The Association argued that 
different legislation at the state level would create an unfair playing 
field for universities and student athletes.140 The NCAA announced 
that each division will modernize their rules in response to the state 
and federal legislative environment.141  
A. Board of Governors Report 
On October 29, 2019, the NCAA revealed that the Board of 
Governors (“the Board”) will start the process “to enhance name, 
image, and likeness opportunities” for collegiate athletes.142 Michael 
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Drake, chair of the Board, said that the NCAA must embrace change 
and continue to take affirmative steps for additional flexibility as the 
Association has done in recent years.143 The Board announced this 
decision after reviewing recommendations provided by the NCAA 
Federal and State Legislation Working Group (“the Group”).144 The 
Group consisted of presidents, commissioners, athletic directors, 
administrators, and student athletes.145 The Group spent several 
months gathering feedback from current and former student athletes, 
coaches, faculty, and commissioners to provide the Board with an 
informed and thorough report (“the Report”).146 Acknowledging that 
suggestions from each NCAA division are necessary before finalizing 
any changes, the Group made the following recommendations:  
 Assure student-athletes are treated similarly to non-athlete 
students unless a compelling reason exists to differentiate.  
 Maintain the priorities of education and the collegiate 
experience to provide opportunities for student-athlete 
success.  
 Ensure rules are transparent, focused and enforceable and 
facilitate fair and balanced competition.  
 Make clear the distinction between collegiate and professional 
opportunities.  
 Make clear that compensation for athletics performance or 
participation is impermissible.  
 Reaffirm that student-athletes are students first and not 
employees of the university.  
 Enhance principles of diversity, inclusion and gender equity.  
 Protect the recruiting environment and prohibit inducements to 
select, remain at, or transfer to a specific institution.147 
The Report emphasized that the use of an athlete’s NIL should in no 
way be considered a substitute currency in a pay for play model.148  
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Another problem that the Report notes is the lack of uniformity 
that individual state legislation, like the California law, will create.149 
One of the most important aspects of this process is drafting rules that 
each state will adopt, allowing national consistency.150 The Group will 
continue to collect suggestions and evaluate options until April 2020, 
while each division begins drafting potential new rules.151 The Board 
instructed each division to begin the process but specified that each 
division must submit their proposed rules by January 2021.152 This 
deadline falls before the California legislation is set to take effect in 
2023.  
The Group analyzed the NIL opportunities on a continuum, 
noting potential issues and examples of regulation on both ends of the 
spectrum.153 On one end, the Group stated that student athletes should 
receive compensation for their NIL when it is in the interest of 
promoting their work product or business, especially when unrelated 
to athletics.154 In the event that the work product or business is related 
to athletics, the Group suggested that the NCAA implement certain 
regulations to monitor any potential abuse.155 The Group listed 
examples of potential regulations including prior approval by athletic 
directors or university representatives and prohibiting school 
involvement in the development or promotion of related 
opportunities.156 On the other end of the spectrum, the Group 
addressed one of the more obvious concerns: allowing student athletes 
to receive compensation for their NIL would be the equivalent of 
allowing student athletes to receive compensation for participating in 
athletic events.157 The Group noted again that this form of 
compensation is potentially pay for play, which is inconsistent with 
the collegiate model.158 The Report suggested that the NCAA prohibit 
agreements that require or encourage enrollment in a particular school 
or group of schools.159 Another potential regulation involves 
 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Osburn, supra note 39. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Federal and State Working Group, supra note 147, at 4. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 5.  
 157. Id.at 6.  
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 
306 TEXAS A&M J. PROP. L. [Vol. 7 
 
restricting college athletes or third parties from using any institutional, 
conference, or NCAA brand marks in the activity.160  
B. Division Regulations 
The NCAA instructed each division to evaluate their current 
rules and draft new or amended rules.161 The Report outlines two areas 
where the NCAA needs to address NIL compensation: (1) 
compensation for NIL when promoting work product or business and 
(2) compensation derived from a student athlete’s association with 
their university or participation in NCAA athletics.162  
In a short statement regarding new action by the NCAA, the 
Board already provided more information on how to realistically 
address the compensation issue than any proposed legislation. The text 
of the Act itself lacks any indication of how California institutions will 
regulate student athlete compensation or even who holds that 
responsibility.163 The Report mentions consistency as one of the most 
important aspects of responding to the legislative environment.164 As 
this Comment points out, California is not the only state to announce 
new legislation. If every state enacted similar legislation but included 
different requirements, such as the New York bill requiring 
distribution of 15% of revenue to student athletes, it would be nearly 
impossible to regulate collegiate sports. Therefore, consistency is the 
basis for drafting new regulations for all NCAA member schools to 
implement.   
The Report differentiates the first type of compensation by 
work product or business unrelated to athletics and work product or 
business that is related to athletics.165 The most difficult issue will be 
determining where value driven by the work product ends and value 
driven by the student athlete’s NIL begins.166 The Report suggested 
that the NCAA may address these concerns by requiring prior 
approval from an athletic director or representative.167 In order for this 
regulation to work, each university would need to create an athletic 
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director position to keep track of which student athletes this regulation 
applies to and monitor whether the student is seeking approval or not; 
this would require significant time and commitment from the athletic 
director. It would also be beneficial to implement penalties for 
noncompliance, another aspect requiring time and commitment by 
representatives.168  
Division III delegates provided updates and received input at 
the 2020 NCAA Convention.169 The Division III Issues Forum 
highlighted the NIL topic, discussing potential areas of change.170 
Delegates at the forum led the conversation on innovative 
compensation models that allow compensation for the use of NIL, 
noting that any new legislation related to NIL issues would not be 
presented until the 2021 Convention.171 Division III rules currently 
include specific exceptions that allow the use of NIL, such as 
“institutional, charitable, educational and nonprofit; modeling and 
other non-athletically related promotional activity; media activities; 
and student athlete’s own business.”172 At the convention, members 
stated that “fairness, equity, and opportunity” were key concepts to 
consider as the modernization process continues.173 
V. IMPACT AND SUGGESTIONS 
As this Comment emphasizes, the NCAA is committed to 
adopting a comprehensive solution that allows student athletes 
participating in college athletics to benefit from the use of their NIL, 
so long as that compensation complies with the NCAA collegiate 
model.174 The NCAA acknowledges that as the realm of college 
athletics changes, student athletes have a right to benefit from the use 
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of their reputation while competing at the collegiate level.175 NCAA 
President Mark Emmert addressed concerns surrounding the use of 
NIL at the NCAA 2020 Convention, stressing the importance of the 
Association’s role in developing rules that support student athletes.176 
Emmert stated that he “regularly meets with lawmakers” and noted 
that their concerns are broad and span more issues than just NIL.177 
He defined the ongoing debate as one over “inherent fairness.”178 
Emmert closed the presentation by saying, “[the NCAA] may need 
help from Congress and others along the way, but this is our job.”179 
By highlighting their role in this process, the NCAA outwardly 
takes responsibility for implementing effective change. The NCAA 
must adapt its bylaws and implement a new compensation model for 
all member schools to follow. The Association maintains a strict 
distinction between amateurs and professional athletes, and allowing 
student athletes to receive compensation while in college will affect 
the meaning of those words. Therefore, the NCAA must reevaluate the 
definitions contained in its bylaws and amend the language to reflect 
the Association’s modernization. The NCAA must also develop and 
implement a new compensation model that considers the proposed 
changes and the demands of student athletes.  
A. Definitions that Create Consistency 
The NCAA continues to voice its opinion on one major 
problem with the new legislation: the possibility that student athlete 
compensation will be a substitute currency in a pay for play model.180 
Following the recommendations in the Report, the NCAA must amend 
its bylaws and redefine the terms at issue as the Association develops 
a new compensation model. One problem with the California 
legislation is the name itself. The Act is referred to as the Fair Pay to 
Play Act, insinuating that student athletes will be paid simply for their 
participation athletic programs. In reality, the Act allows for student 
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athletes to receive compensation not for their participation in athletics 
but for the use of their NIL, mannerisms, and overall identity. Even 
more controversial, the New York bill would require each NCAA 
member school in New York to set aside 15% of their revenue from 
athletic ticket sales to divide among student athletes.181 The goal of 
the Group and the NCAA is to create new rules that anticipate and 
allow for future compensation of college athletes while preserving 
amateurism in the collegiate model.182  
The NCAA does not define amateur athlete, but it does define 
professional athlete. Essentially, the NCAA defines professional 
athlete as an individual who receives payment for their participation 
in an athletic event; therefore, the NCAA should redefine pay and 
compensation to ensure that student athletes do not receive payment 
for their participation even if they receive compensation while 
competing in college athletics. The rules should differentiate between 
professional athletes who receive a salary for their participation in 
sporting events and collegiate athletes who receive compensation for 
their NIL—essentially their public appeal. This would ensure clarity 
when drafting and enforcing new regulations and would protect the 
Association’s notion of amateurism.   
B. Fair & Enforceable Compensation Model 
The NCAA should create a compensation model that allows 
student athletes to receive compensation for their NIL, while honoring 
its fundamental beliefs in amateurism and commitment to education. 
To achieve these goals, the most effective model is a trust fund model 
that distributes money on a predetermined schedule. However, the 
trust fund model is not new. While the models suggested in the past 
are beneficial to student athletes and provide a solution to the 
compensation issue, they are vulnerable to attacks based on 
employment status, personal regulation, and education. The best 
model to adopt is a distributed trust fund compensation model with 
modifications that account for the NCAA’s focus on amateurism and 
education; the concern that student athletes will be viewed as 
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employees; and student athletes’ best interests. The proposed 
framework has three components: the right to receive payments, 
scheduled distribution, and regulation and oversight.  
1. Right to Receive Payments 
First, the proposed model clearly indicates that student athletes 
will have the right to receive compensation for their NIL and that their 
compensation will be placed in a trust fund. The NCAA should adopt 
a trust fund model similar to those suggested in the past but should not 
allow student athletes to receive any part of institution’s revenue from 
merchandise incorporating the student athlete’s NIL. Instead, this 
model should focus on the student athlete’s ability to engage in 
endorsement deals related to their NIL. The model should not make 
any comparisons to student athletes as employees or indicate that 
compensation is for their athletic ability. Essentially, all endorsement 
deals should originate from third parties, removing the possibility that 
universities compensate the student athlete directly.   
Various arguments focus on a multiyear scholarship or trust 
fund structure for compensation. For example, one model suggests a 
percentage-based trust fund in which the student athlete receives a 
percentage of the NCAA’s revenue from merchandise containing the 
student athlete’s NIL.183 In this model, the terms of the trust fund, 
specifically the percentage of revenue, are negotiated during the 
recruiting process.184 Even though this model allows student athletes 
to receive compensation, it potentially infringes too far into the realm 
of professional sports. Negotiating terms and percentages during the 
recruitment process undermines the meaning of amateurism and leads 
to inequality among member schools and student athletes.  
Two other trust fund based models have been suggested over 
the years.185 In O’Bannon, the plaintiffs suggested a trust fund model 
in which compensation would be placed in a trust fund until the 
student athlete graduated or left the school.186 The International 
Olympic Committee (“IOC”) adopted a similar structure; however, it 
allowed student athletes to access the funds both during and after their 
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time competing.187 The IOC model suggests that student athletes are 
entitled to withdraw funds during their competition season only to pay 
for necessary expenses.188 However, after the conclusion of the 
competitive season each year, student athletes have the right to access 
any remaining funds at their discretion.189 Both of these models 
incorporate a percentage of revenue from the sale of merchandise 
containing the athlete’s NIL.190 Although these arguments provide 
examples of possible solutions, they either contain specific flaws, 
making them difficult to implement, or they came at a time when the 
NCAA felt less pressure to initiate change. However, the NCAA is 
now at a point where a trust fund model may be the most effective 
option to satisfy the demands of student athletes.  
The model proposed in this Comment allows student athletes 
to receive compensation for their NIL based on endorsement deals 
they make during their collegiate career, rather than receiving 
distributions from the NCAA or their university’s revenue. The money 
received from endorsement deals should be placed in a trust fund and 
distributed based on a schedule, which is detailed in the second 
component of this structure.  
2. Scheduled Distribution 
The second component of this structure is the distribution 
method. The terms of the contract should outline a percentage of the 
compensation that the student athlete may receive while competing in 
college athletics. This structure differs from the trust fund models 
described above because the percentage the athlete receives will not 
come from the university’s revenue. The student athlete will receive 
the percentage of their compensation at the end of each academic year. 
The student athlete will receive the remainder of the compensation 
upon graduation from the university they attend. If the student athlete 
elects to pursue professional athletics before obtaining their degree, 
essentially initiating a breach of contract, the student athlete forfeits a 
predetermined percentage of their compensation to the NCAA and 
their member school. This provides an incentive for student athletes to 
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continue their education and compensates the NCAA and member 
institution for any loss of expected benefits. Withholding part of the 
student athlete’s compensation until graduation also emphasizes the 
NCAA’s focus on education.  
In comparison to the O’Bannon model, the model proposed in 
this Comment gives student athletes the right to receive a fraction of 
their compensation at the end of each academic year. However, it is 
similar to the O’Bannon model by withholding the remainder of 
compensation until the student graduates or leaves the institution. Like 
the IOC model, the model proposed here allows student athletes to 
receive part of their compensation during their time at the university. 
However, unlike the IOC model, student athletes do not have the 
ability to access the funds at any time. Also, this model does not 
suggest that the NCAA or member schools have the ability to regulate 
the ways in which the student athlete uses the distributed funds.   
3. Regulation & Oversight 
The third component of the proposed model requires that a 
representative from the NCAA and the member university oversee the 
execution of the contract. When executing endorsement deals, student 
athletes must comply with uniform terms generated by the NCAA and 
member schools. If an athlete fails to comply with the defined terms 
in any way, the athlete loses their eligibility to compete in NCAA 
events. Uniform terms will ensure consistency in the ways that student 
athletes receive compensation and avoid issues affecting the eligibility 
of the athlete or member school. The NCAA should also consider 
including terms that limit the length of contracts. For example, student 
athletes may not execute compensation contracts that extend longer 
than five years; however, they may renegotiate contracts to align with 
the student athlete’s eligibility schedule.   
The trust fund model proposed in this Comment addresses 
certain issues that other suggested models ignore, increasing the 
probability of its success if adopted by the NCAA. The revenue 
sharing aspect of various models creates a problem regarding the 
status of the student athlete during their time at the institution. If the 
athlete receives a percentage of the university’s revenue, the athlete 
begins to look more like an employee of the university, rather than a 
student. To avoid the possibility that student athletes become 
employees, the NCAA should adopt a compensation model that 
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ignores revenue sharing. Also, the proposed model does not allow the 
NCAA to regulate the student athlete’s use of compensation funds, 
giving student athletes complete control over their compensation. 
The NCAA should also consider how modernization will 
affect individuals that member schools intend to recruit. The right to 
receive compensation as a student athlete will not only affect college 
athletes but also high school athletes. To address this issue, the NCAA 
should restrict the type of student athlete eligible to receive 
compensation. The NCAA could implement this restriction in two 
ways. First, the Association could amend their eligibility rules. If 
athletes receive compensation or execute a contract to receive 
compensation before competing at the collegiate level, they will be 
ineligible to compete in NCAA athletic events. This method would 
reduce the possibility of paying student athletes to compete. The 
second way that the NCAA could create this type of restriction is to 
include a term in compensation contracts that requires proof of 
enrollment at a member school. Although the NCAA’s current bylaws 
may address this issue in some way, it is important that the NCAA 
create as much consistency as possible moving forward to ensure 
fairness and equity across the different sports and divisions.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Act from California and similar legislation finally forced 
the NCAA to make significant changes regarding student athletes’ 
right to compensation. As the NCAA continues to modernize its rules, 
the Association must act in the best interest of student athletes and 
consider the purpose of the proposed legislation. Although the rules 
may be marginally different across NCAA divisions, the critical factor 
of modernization is adapting and enforcing the regulations in a 
uniform manner. The trust fund structure proposed in this Comment 
maintains the concept of amateurism by avoiding any inclination that 
the student athlete receive payment solely for their participation or 
commitment to participate at a particular university. Student athletes 
will have the right to receive compensation for the use of their NIL by 
engaging in endorsement deals during their time competing in college 
athletics. The proposed model considers the call to action by student 
athletes, highlights their right to receive compensation for their NIL, 
and maintains the NCAA’s amateurism standards.  
